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I. Introduction 
 
In this Essay, I continue my previous analysis of the first sale rule (or principle of 
exhaustion) in intellectual property law in the context of international trade.
1
  In 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, 
National University of Singapore. This Essay has benefitted from comments and conversation with 
many colleagues. In particular, I thank Margaret Chon, John Cross, Christine Haight Farley, Eric 
Goldman, Leah Chan Grinvald, Paul Heald, Steven Hetcher, Mary LaFrance, Marshall Leaffer, 
Edward Lee, Jacqueline Lipton, Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, Ng Loy Wee Loon, Elisabeth Ng Siew 
Kuan, Burton Ong, Lisa Ramsey, Mary Wong, and Peter Yu. I also thank Heather Stutz for 
research assistance. This Essay  summarizes my preliminary considerations on this topic and draws 
from research on a larger project that I will continue over the next year and that will be published, 
in part, in LA PROPRIETÉ INTELLECTUELLE ET LA CIRCULATION INTERNATIONALE DES BIENS, 
forthcoming 2014  (Pierre-Emanuel Moyse ed.).  The views expressed in this Essay, and any 
mistakes, remain my own. 
1 In previous works I have analyzed, in details, the first sale rule in trademark and copyright law. In 
this Essay, I compare the two different rules in light of the current development in the case law in 
the United States. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, An American Tale: The Unclear Application of the First 
Sale Rule in United States Copyright Law (and Its Impact on International Trade), in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADE 67 (Jan Rosen ed., 2013) [hereinafter 
Calboli, First Sale in Copyright Law]; Irene Calboli, Market Integration and (the Limits of) the 
First Sale Rule in North American and European Trademark Law, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241 
(2011) [hereinafter Calboli, First Sale Rule in Trademark Law]; Irene Calboli, Trademark 
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particular, I highlight the differences between the first sale rules in trademark and 
copyright law—in particular, international first sale in trademark law and 
national first sale (at least to date) in copyright law—and criticize the corporate 
trend to invoke copyright protection for incidental product features of otherwise 
functional and uncopyrightable products in order to restrict the importation of 
gray market (genuine) products into the United States.  During the past decade, 
corporations have increasingly turned to copyright law to protect the designs 
used in their labels, logos, products packaging, and so forth.
2
  However, I 
elaborate in this Essay that this trend is frequently finalized at leveraging the 
copyright protection on these designs to encompass the entire products to which 
these designs are affixed, and in turn circumvent the rule of trademark law 
(international first sale) by blocking the importation of gray market products 
under the more business-friendly rule of national copyright first sale. 
   
Hence, I argue in this Essay that this opportunistic exploitation of copyright 
protection in the context of the international trade of consumer products directly 
undermines the policy objectives both of copyright and trademark law.
3
  
Copyright and trademark law generally follow different rules—for the 
acquisition, enforcement, and limitation of the exclusive rights that are granted 
under their respective regimes—and find their justification in different policy 
objectives. Copyright protection stems from the Intellectual Property Clause of 
the Constitution, which grants Congress the authority “to promote the Progress of 
Science and the Useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
                                                                                                                                                
Exhaustion in the European Union: Community-Wide or International? The Saga Continues, 6 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47 (2002).  
2 For a description (and different positions) on this practice, see Teresa Scassa, Using Copyright to 
Prevent Parallel Importation: A Comment on Kraft Canada, Inc. v. Euro Excellence, 85 CAN. BAR 
REV. 409, 410 (2006) (critically advocating against the practice of using copyright protection to 
prevent the importation of otherwise legitimate gray market products).  Professor Scassa quotes 
Wee W. Webster, Restraining the Gray Marketer: Policy and Practice, 4 C.I.P.R. 211, 225 (1988) 
(supporting the same practice). Id. at 410, n.4. For an early analysis of this practice, see also Donna 
K. Hintz, Battling Gray Market Goods With Copyright Law, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1187, 1212-13 (1994) 
(underscoring the difficulties in interpreting the first sale rule provisions in the Copyright Act and 
advocating for a legislative amendment clarifying that copyright owners can prevent the 
importation of copyrighted gray market products). 
3 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(highlighting the “public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”). 
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Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”4  In 
contrast, trademark law derives its authority from the Commerce Clause and 
trademark protection focuses primarily on guaranteeing fairness in competition 
by preventing consumer confusion and by protecting the goodwill established by 
a mark in the marketplace.
5
  Accordingly, claims of copyright protection for 
incidental product features of otherwise functional products inevitably distort the 
traditional objectives of both copyright and trademark protection.  Ultimately, 
these claims aim primarily at leveraging copyright protection to control product 
distribution in the international market.  In this Essay I advocate, in particular, 
that these claims are an opportunistic exploitation of copyright protection, and 
that the courts should expressly define and prohibit these claims as a type of 
copyright misuse.
6
 
 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I provide a brief 
overview of the differences between the first sale rules in trademark and 
copyright law. In Part III, I criticize the growing practice of corporations 
leveraging copyright protection for incidental features of otherwise 
uncopyrightable products in order to invoke the principle of national first sale in 
copyright law for products in their entirety to prevent the importation of gray 
market products.  In particular, I argue that this practice amounts to copyright 
misuse, as it has been recently recognized by part of the judiciary, and I call upon 
the courts to consistently embrace this line of reasoning and curtail this misuse of 
copyright protection by corporations.  In Part IV, I evaluate the possible 
outcomes of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
7
 which is currently pending in the 
                                                          
4 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–96 (1879); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“Trademark law . 
. . can be best explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”). 
6 Generally, on the doctrine of copyright misuse, see Assessment Tech. of Wisconsin, L.L.C. v. 
Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 
(5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). In 2011, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of California ruled that Omega’s attempt to leverage copyright protection on an 
insignia engraved on the back of Omegas’ watches was copyright misuse. See Omega S.A. v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155893 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9. 2011). In this Essay, I 
specifically advocate that the Ninth Circuit affirm the decision of the lower count in this case. See 
infra Part IV. 
7 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1905, 
(U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697). 
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Supreme Court on the territorial extent of the copyright first sale rule, and Omega 
v. Costco Wholesale,
8
 which is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit on the 
issue of gray market products and copyright misuse.  I specifically advocate that 
the Ninth Circuit finds that Omega misused copyright law when it claimed 
copyright protection for a small design engraved on the back of its watches to 
prevent the unauthorized importation of these watches into the United States.  In 
this part, I also call upon Congress to consider a legislative amendment to the 
text of the Copyright Act to formally prohibit the leveraging of copyright 
protection for incidental product features in the context of international trade, 
following the examples of other common law jurisdictions.  Still, I conclude, in 
the immediate future the responsibility remains with the courts—the Ninth 
Circuit in first instance—to prevent corporations from opportunistically 
exploiting overlapping copyrights and trademarks. This in turn would prevent 
that corporations block the importation of legitimate gray market products to the 
detriment of consumers, market competition, and the general equilibrium of the 
intellectual property system. 
 
 
II. The (Still Different) First Sale Rules in Trademark and Copyright Law 
 
Traditionally, intellectual property first sale rules developed as judicial doctrines 
or originated as statutory provisions to balance the exclusive rights granted to 
businesses, inventors, and creators in their products and works, with the rights of 
retailers, consumers, and second-hand dealers to freely resell or dispose of these 
products and works after having lawfully acquired them in the market.
9
  
However, intellectual property owners frequently attempt to bypass these rules—
with contractual provisions or otherwise—as these rules directly limit their 
ability to control product distribution (and pricing strategies) in the aftermarket.
10
  
                                                          
8 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11-57137 (9th Cir. July 25, 2012).   
9 See, e.g., Calboli, First Sale Rule in Trademark Law, supra note 1, at 1250-51 (tracing the origin 
of the first sale rule in trademark law); Calboli, First Sale Rule in Copyright Law, supra note 1, at 
71-72 (tracing the origin of the first sale rule in copyright law); see also John A. Rothchild, 
Exhausting Extraterritoriality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 1187-88 (2011). 
10 The corporate opposition to gray market products is well summarized in the position adopted by 
the International Trademark Association (INTA) in 2007. See Position Paper on Parallel Imports 
INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (July 2007), available at 
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTAParallelImports2007.pdf. 
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In particular, strong disputes have defined the application of first sale rules in the 
context of international trade.
11
  Intellectual property owners generally engage in 
different pricing strategies across countries based on the circumstances of each 
country (competition in the national market, average income, and so forth).  As a 
result, they oppose the international arbitrage of their products (usually from low-
cost to high-cost countries) by gray marketers (unauthorized importers). National 
governments, in turn, follow different positions on the issue—permitting or 
blocking the importation of gray market products—based on the economic and 
public policy interests of the specific jurisdictions.
12
 Developed countries usually 
tend to oppose the importation of gray market products into their countries while 
developing countries generally favor it.
 13
 
 
Precisely because of the diverging national interests among the various members 
on the World Trade Organization (WTO), Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
14
 states that nothing in 
the Agreement can “be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights.”15  Lacking a common international standard, WTO members’ 
approaches to first sale rules thus follow one of three systems, which may also 
vary depending on the subject matter at issue (patents, trademarks, and 
                                                          
11 The academic literature in this area is extensive.  See, e.g. Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition 
of Parallel Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights, 30 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. [IIC] 495 (1999) (Ger.); Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International 
Trade, 28 IIC 623 (1997) (Ger.); Herman Cohen Jehoram, International Exhaustion versus 
Importation Right: A Murky Area of Intellectual Property Law, 4 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUIT.] 280 (1996) (Ger.). 
12 See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks 
of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 747, 769-96 (1989); Frederick M. Abbott, 
Parallel Importation: Economic and Social Welfare Dimensions, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., 5 
(June 2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/parallel_importation.pdf; see also Vincent Chiappetta, 
The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion, and a 
Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333 (2000). 
13 See S.K. Verma, Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of the 
TRIPS Agreements, 29 IIC 534, 536 (1998) (Ger.). 
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L M. 83 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS].  
15 Id. art. 6. See Verma, supra note 13 at 539. 
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copyright).
16
  First, under national first sale (or national exhaustion), national 
rights are exhausted only after the products have been distributed for sale in the 
national market, and intellectual property owners can oppose gray market 
products from outside the national market.  Second, under international first sale 
(or international exhaustion), national rights are exhausted regardless of where 
the products have been distributed for sale in the world, and intellectual property 
owners cannot prevent gray market products in the national market.  Third, under 
regional first sale (or regional exhaustion), national rights are exhausted after the 
products have been distributed for sale in a specific region (like the European 
Union) and intellectual property owners cannot oppose the further circulation of 
the products within that region. However, owners can oppose gray market 
products from outside the region. 
 
Similar to other developed countries, the United States follows a system of 
national first sale with respect to patent law and patented products.
17
  Yet, United 
States follows, instead, a system of international first sale with respect to 
trademark law and trademarked products.
18
 However, the United States’ position 
with respect to copyright first sale is less clear. Courts and scholars disagree over 
whether the Copyright Act establishes a system of national or international first 
sale, even though the majority of the courts have thus far favored an 
interpretation of the statute as establishing a system of national first sale.
19
 
 
The United States position on trademark first sale derives from the traditional 
premise that trademarks are not protected as property per se, but exclusively as 
indicators of commercial origin and symbols of business goodwill.  Based on this 
                                                          
16 For a detailed explanation of the different approaches on intellectual property first sale rules, see 
Calboli, First Sale Rule in Trademark Law, supra note 1, at 1250-51. 
17 Even though the Patent Act does not explicitly limit the first sale rule to national sale, courts 
have consistently found that international sale does not exhaust patent rights. See Fuji Photo Film 
Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that “[t]he patentee’s 
authorization of an international first sale does not affect exhaustion of that patentee’s rights in the 
United States” and that “foreign sales can never occur under a United States patent because the 
United States patent system does not provide for extraterritorial effect.”). This Essay  does not 
address a detailed analysis of the United States’ approach to the first sale rule in patent law.  
18 See generally Calboli, First Sale Rule in Trademark Law, supra note 1, at 1250-51 (summarizing 
the principle of rule of trademark first sale in the United States). 
19 See generally Calboli, First Sale Rule in Copyright Law, supra note 1, at 71-73 (highlighting the 
current disputes over the territorial extent of the application of section 109(a) of the Copyright Act). 
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premise, the importation of gray market goods is allowed as long as consumers 
are not confused as to the origin and quality of the marked products.
20
 The public 
policy objective of this rule rests on the position that the public should be 
allowed to benefit from the lower prices and increased competition resulting 
from non-confusing gray market products, and trademark owners should not rely 
on trademark rights to partition the international market (despite the profit losses 
that this may entail for trademark owners).
21
 In particular, trademark law permits 
the importation of gray market goods when “both the foreign and the U.S. 
trademark or trade name are owned by the same person or business entity.”22  To 
avoid strategic assignments between affiliated companies to circumvent this rule, 
the concept of “same ownership” includes “parent and subsidiary companies or 
[companies] otherwise subject to common ownership or control.”23  As an 
exception to this general rule, trademark owners can block gray market products 
when these products, despite being genuine and first offered for sale by the same 
trademark owners abroad, are “materially different” from the goods that 
trademark owners are selling in the domestic market.
24
  This exception was 
originally developed in the Lever Brothers cases
25
 and is based upon the 
consideration that consumers could be confused as to the actual quality of the 
marked products if two products with identical appearance are sold in the United 
States under the same marks but are of different quality.  Still, under the revised 
                                                          
20 The U.S. Tariff Act prohibits the importation of a product that “bears a trademark owned by a 
citizen of . . . the United States and is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”  See 
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006).  The Lanham Act bars the importation of goods 
with a mark that will “copy or simulate” a registered trademark.  Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 
(2006). 
21 See, e.g., Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(underscoring that “the consumer gets exactly what the consumer bargains for, the genuine product 
of the particular producer”). 
22 KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 289 (1988). 
23 Id.  at 288 (indicating that the  protection afforded by the Tariff Act 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) is 
exclusively for domestic U.S. trademark owners that have no corporate affiliation with the foreign 
manufacturer). 
24 See J. Thomas MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 10, § 
29:50–51.75. 
25 Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (the court stated that when a 
mark is applied to physically different goods, the mark is not “genuine” and the affiliation between 
the producers does not reduce the resulting likelihood of consumer confusion.); Lever Bros. Co. v. 
United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Société Des Produits Nestlé, S.A. v. Casa 
Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 639 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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Customs Service Regulations, gray marketers can lawfully import materially 
different products into the national territory as long as they properly label the 
products to alert consumers about their different quality.
26
  The policy behind the 
Customs Service Regulations’ limitation to the Lever Brother rule rests again on 
the fact that, as long as consumers are not confused as a result of the different 
quality of products, consumers should benefit from the lower prices and the 
increased competition that gray market products may bring into the United States 
market. 
 
Conversely, the United States’ position with respect to the first sale rule in 
copyright law is unsettled and clarification is currently awaited from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons.27 Originally, the first sale 
rule was first developed by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus,
28
 and 
was later codified in the 1909 Copyright Act, under which “the exclusive right to 
‘vend’ was limited to the first sales of the work.”29  The 1976 Copyright Act 
confirmed the first sale rule in section 109(a), which states that the owners of 
copyrighted works “lawfully made under this title” are entitled “to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that [work]” without the “authority of the 
copyright owner.”30  However, Congress did not clarify the territorial extent of 
section 109(a).  Still, the majority of the courts (and copyright owners) generally 
supported the view that section 109(a) applies only to domestic and not 
international sale.
31
 Courts derived this position from the combined interpretation 
                                                          
26 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b) (2012) (“Goods determined by the Customs Service to be physically and 
materially different . . . shall not be detained . . . where the merchandise or its packaging bears a 
conspicuous and legible label . . .” that indicates that “[t]his product is not a product authorized by 
the United States trademark owner for importation and is physically and materially different from 
the authorized products.”); see also Mark S. Sommers & Louis J. Levy, US Customs Amends Gray 
Market Import Rule, 117 TRADEMARK WORLD 32, 33 (1999). 
27 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
1905, (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697). 
28 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
29 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v L’anza Research Int’l,  Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1998) 
(“Congress subsequently codified our holding in Bobbs-Merrill that the exclusive right to ‘vend’ 
was limited to first sales of the work.”). 
30 The Copyright Act, 17 USC § 109(a) (2008). 
31 See, e.g., Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996); Parfums 
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 
F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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of section 109(a) and section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which provides that 
the “[i]mportation into the United States” of a copyrighted work acquired outside 
the United States “without the authority of the [copyright] owner” is “an 
infringement of the exclusive right [of] distribut[ion].”32  Only a minority of 
courts, most notably the Third Circuit, agreed that section 109(a) limits the 
importation right in section 602(a)(1) and equally applies to national and 
international sales.
33
  Nonetheless, the majoritarian position on the issue may 
change soon as a result of the certiorari pending in front of the Supreme Court in 
Kirtsaeng.
34
 
 
Not surprisingly, after the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, the business 
world (and intellectual property lawyers) realized that, compared to the 
international first sale rule in trademark law, the rule on national copyright first 
sale could provide corporations with assistance in their fight against gray market 
products.
35
  Corporations thus started to seek copyright protection for their 
consumer products. However, since consumer products are frequently functional 
and accordingly uncopyrightable, corporations strategically claimed copyright 
protection for other (nonfunctional) parts of their products. This practice resulted 
in copyright registrations for incidental product features—labels, decorations on 
packaging, and so forth—as these incidental elements could fit more easily under 
the scope of copyright protection.
36
  Corporations then relied on the copyright 
                                                          
32 The Copyright Act, 17 USC § 602(a)(1) (2008). Since section 602(1)(a) was introduced in the 
Copyright Act, the majority of the courts interpreted the provision as intending to bar the 
unauthorized importation of copyrighted products even when the products had been lawfully been 
made and first distributed abroad under the authorization of copyright owners. See e.g. Parfums 
Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481. 
33 See, e.g., Sebastian Int’l Inc. v Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(stressing that if section 109(a) applied only to copies sold in the U.S.; copyright owners selling 
copies abroad would receive a purchase price and a right to limit importation, whereas copyright 
owners selling copies domestically would only receive the purchase price). 
34 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
1905, (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697) 
35 See Willie Skinner, Note, Preventing Gray Markets: Is Copyright Law the Answer?, 26 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 315, 328 (1999). 
36 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information.” 17 USC § 101 (2008). “An article that is normally a part of a useful article is 
considered a ‘useful article’.” Id. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. 
Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2003); Superior Form Builders, Inc. 
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protection for these features to control the circulation of the entire products 
carrying the incidental copyrighted feature.  In particular, corporations started to 
invoke section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act and claimed copyright 
infringement against the importation of gray market goods which carried those 
copyrighted product features.
37
  However, once litigation was brought forth, 
importers and distributors accused of copyright infringement challenged the 
conventional interpretation that the combined language of sections 109(a) and 
602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act supported a system of national first sale allowing 
corporations to segment international markets.  Instead, importers and 
distributors argued that in the absence of specific guidance in the Copyright Act, 
section 109(a) limits section 602(1)(a) and equally applies to products first sold 
nationally and internationally.
38
 In other words, the provision could not be used 
to prevent the importation of gray market products. 
 
In the late 1990s, in Quality King v. L’anza,39 a case involving gray market hair 
care products and a claim of copyright infringement in the products’ labels and 
instructions, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue for the first time. The Court’s 
ruling did not clarify, but rather complicated the issue. Ultimately, the Court 
ruled in favor of the distributor and found that copyright in the products had been 
exhausted, yet it reached this conclusion only because the products had been 
made and first sold in the United States, then exported abroad, and eventually re-
imported into the United States (the so called “round-trip”).40  Still, the Court did 
not take a position on whether section 109(a) could be applied to all gray market 
products which had been made and first distributed with the authorization of 
copyright owners.
41
  Absent such important clarification, the decision seemed to 
confirm the previous majoritarian position that the United States follows a 
system of national copyright first sale, especially with respect to products first 
                                                                                                                                                
v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 493 (4th Cir. 1996); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. 
Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146–47 (2d Cir. 1987).  
37 See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008); L’anza 
Research Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs. Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996). 
38 See, e.g., Sebastian Int’l. 847 F.2d 1093. 
39 Quality King Distribs. Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
40 Id. at 139, 153–54. 
41 See generally Calboli, First Sale Rule in Copyright Law, supra note 1, at 79 (summarizing the 
decision and highlighting that the “Supreme Court’s decision fell short of addressing the territorial 
extent of the first sale rule in copyright law”). 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
distributed abroad.  Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority precisely on 
this premise.
42
 More problematically, she stated that “lawfully made under this 
title” meant “lawfully made in the United States,”43 thus (maybe unintentionally) 
suggesting that section 109(a) would not apply to foreign manufactured goods 
even after these goods have been distributed in the United States under the 
authority of the copyright owners. Not surprisingly, additional litigation followed 
after Quality King. In 2010, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari in Costco 
v. Omega,
44
 a case involving gray market watches carrying a copyrighted 
(minuscule) insignia.  This time the products had been made and first distributed 
in Europe and were later imported into the United States.  The Court’s decision 
was again disappointing. , The Justices equally divided and, in a nine-word per 
curiam decision,
45
 affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit in favor of Omega, 
where the Ninth Circuit supported the interpretation that section 109(a) only 
applies after the products have been distributed in the United States.
46
  Clearly 
aware of the pressing need to resolve, once and for all, the growing ambiguities 
in this area, in April 2012, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari in 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons.
47
  This case concerned gray market books (not 
incidental product features) and a decision on the case is awaited in the near 
future. As I elaborate in Part IV, this decision will prove crucial to clarify the 
territorial extent of the first sale rule in copyright law, and could possibly end the 
corporate game of leveraging copyright protection for incidental product features 
to circumvent the international first sale in trademark law. 
 
                                                          
42 See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Justice Ginsburg underscored that 
she was only joining the majority in recognizing that the decision was not resolving “cases in which 
the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad”). 
43 Id. (Ginsburg J., concurring) (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 166–70  
(1997 SUPP.) and 10 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 16.0, 16:1–16:2 (2d ed. 1998)). 
44 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A. 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (Justice Kagan recused herself 
due to her previous role as solicitor general). 
45 Id.  
46 See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Parfums 
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481(9th Cir. 1994) and Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Samuel Brooks, Note, Battling 
Gray Markets Through Copyright Law: Omega SA v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 19 (2010). 
47 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
1905, (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697). 
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III. Leveraging Copyright Protection for Incidental Product Features to 
Prevent the Importation of Gray Market Products: Legitimate Game or 
Copyright Misuse? 
 
The exploitation of one type of intellectual property right to expand rights under 
other types of rights is not a new phenomenon in the business world.  Intellectual 
property owners frequently attempt to exploit overlapping intellectual property 
rights: for example, overlapping patent and trademark protection, or patent and 
copyright protection.  Hence, courts have generally rejected this practice as a 
breach in the political equilibrium of the intellectual property system.
48
  
However, courts have not sufficiently addressed to date—or have confusingly 
addressed—the problems arising from the exploitation of copyright protection in 
the context of the international trade of commercial products and intellectual 
property first sale rules.  To a certain extent, courts have directly avoided 
entering the debate on this issue, which is certainly a difficult issue, but is one 
that ought to be resolved.  For example, even though the Supreme Court noticed 
in Quality King that the case was “unusual” insofar as it concerned “the integrity 
of . . . methods of marketing”49 for shampoos rather than more traditional 
copyrighted works, the Court steered away from addressing the fact that L’anza 
was leveraging copyright protection for incidental product features—the product 
labels—to prevent the importation of the entire shampoo bottles.50  The Court did 
not even touch upon the fact that Omega had affixed a minuscule insignia to its 
watches exclusively to block gray market watches in its non-decision in Costco.
51
  
Similarly, the lower courts that have decided cases in this respect have never 
questioned plaintiffs about the legitimacy of applying copyright protection to 
questionable “works,” nor have they challenged plaintiffs’ strategies of using 
copyright protection to control international product distribution.
52
  Appropriate 
                                                          
48 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141(1989); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 105 (1880). 
49 Quality King Distribs, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140 (1998). 
50 See id. . 
51 See Costco Wholesale Corp. v Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
52  For example, the Ninth Circuit did not raise this issue when it decided the same cases that were 
later decided by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 
982 (9th Cir. 2008); L’anza Research Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs. Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
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judicial guidance is thus urgently needed, and the time has come for the judiciary 
to step into this debate and properly address the boundaries between copyright 
and trademark protection in the context of international trade. 
 
As I highlighted in the Introduction, the public policy objectives that justify 
copyright and trademark protection in the United States (and elsewhere) hinge on 
two separate concepts that do not overlap in purpose—and as a result copyright 
and trademark law follow different rules on requirements, duration, infringement, 
and limitations and exceptions.  Copyright law protects works of authorship to 
reward authors and enrich society with their work. However, the works belong to 
the public domain once the copyright has expired.
53
  In contrast, trademark law 
protects distinctive signs that are used in the course of trade to signal commercial 
origin, sponsorship, or affiliation, but only within the limits of consumer 
confusion and misappropriation of business goodwill.
54
  Accordingly, copyright 
law does not authorize businesses to use to copyright norms to circumvent 
trademark law and control the international distribution and further circulation of 
genuine uncopyrightable products against the rule of international trademark first 
sale.  Moreover, copyright law does not authorize businesses to invoke copyright 
protection for incidental features (decorations of the product packaging, labels, 
product instructions or warranty terms, and so forth) of products that are 
uncopyrightable because they constitute useful articles,
55
 especially when 
businesses leverage this protection to protect the entire product.  As recently 
ruled also by the District Court for the Eastern District of California in Omega v. 
Costco in the remand of the case following the Supreme Court’s non-decision in 
Costco v. Omega, this practice should not be permitted as it clearly represents an 
anomaly within the intellectual property system. Instead, this practice should be 
explicitly prohibited as a misuse of copyright law and policy. 
 
United States courts developed the doctrine of copyright misuse as an equitable 
defense against abusive claims of copyright infringement in the 1990s.
56
  This 
doctrine is modeled primarily after the doctrine of patent misuse, which traces 
                                                          
53 See discussion supra Introduction and Part II. 
54 See id. 
55 See discussion supra Part II. 
56 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 04-05443 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011). 
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back to the 1942 Supreme Court decision in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger.
57
  
In this case, the Court found that patent holders misused their patent rights by 
engaging in overreaching “tying” practices while selling their patented products.  
Such overextension of exclusive rights, the Court held, should not be permitted 
and should result in rendering patent rights unenforceable until the misuses had 
ceased, including withholding remedies for patent infringement or breach of a 
license agreement involving the patent.
58
  However, it was not until 1990, almost 
fifty years after Morton Salt, that the doctrine of misuse was successfully 
invoked in the area of copyright law by an alleged copyright infringer in 
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds.
59
  In this case, the Fourth Circuit agreed with 
the defendant that the plaintiff had misused its copyright when it forbade 
defendant from creating competing software products through an abusive 
licensing agreement. Since Lasercomb, the doctrine of copyright misuse has been 
successfully applied by other courts.
60
  In particular, the Ninth and the Fifth 
Circuits have recognized this doctrine as a valid affirmative defense against 
claims of copyright infringement.
61
  Generally, courts have found copyright 
misuse primarily in two instances: (1) when a copyright holder uses rights 
granted under the Copyright Act in a manner that violates federal antitrust law or 
in a deliberately anti-competitive manner,
62
 and (2) when copyright holders 
attempt to extend their copyright beyond the scope of the exclusive rights granted 
by Congress in a manner that violates the public policy embodied in copyright 
law, including by “leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them to control 
areas outside their monopoly.”63 
                                                          
57 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
58 See id. at 492 (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. § 8). See also 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM 
ON PATENTS, § 19:04 (2003). 
59 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
60 Generally, for a detailed reconstruction of the development of the judicial doctrine of copyright 
misuse, see Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2004). 
61 See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. 
Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Assessment Tech. of WI, L.L.C. 
v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2003) (warning that if AT would “[t]ry by 
contract or otherwise to prevent the municipalities from revealing their own data, especially when . 
. . the complete data are unavailable anywhere else, might constitute copyright misuse.”). 
62 See Judge, supra note 60, at 903 n.4 (quoting In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. 
Supp.2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2002) as the case providing “one of the most thorough summaries 
available of the doctrine’s history and current status”). 
63 Id. at 904. 
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Under these parameters, the doctrine of copyright misuse can certainly be applied 
with respect to the practice of leveraging copyright protection for incidental 
product features to restrict redistribution of products in their entirety.  
Undoubtedly, this practice directly conflicts with the prohibition written into 
copyright law to protect functional devices (which are generally protected under 
patent law).  Similarly, this practice also conflicts with trademark law’s 
procompetitive policy of allowing the resale of lawfully purchased consumer 
goods.
64
  Courts in the United States have repeatedly held that “the right of a 
producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend 
beyond the first sale of the product.”65  This rule was designed to benefit the 
public once trademark owners realized the commercial value of their marks with 
the first sale of their goods in the market, regardless of whether the first sale took 
place within or outside the United States. In addition to the courts, Congress and 
the Customs Services recognize this position and have enacted provisions that 
allow the resale of trademarked goods after their first sale.
66
  Accordingly, 
attempts to circumvent these rules and, ultimately, the underlying policy 
objectives of these rules directly amounts to “leveraging [the] limited [copyright] 
monopoly to allow [businesses] to control areas outside their monopoly.”67 
Courts should thus clearly define and prohibit these attempts as copyright misuse. 
 
To the contrary, should the judiciary continue to avoid entering the debate, 
intellectual property owners will continue to exploit copyright protection for 
incidental aspects of otherwise functional products, which could result in dire 
consequences for market competition.  Undoubtedly, some occasional overlaps in 
the exercise of intellectual property rights are unavoidable in the business world.  
However, such a recurring and systematic exploitation of the differences in the 
first sale rules in copyright and trademark law should be prohibited, as this 
practice goes explicitly against the traditional balance between the interests of 
intellectual property owners and the public interest.  In particular, courts should 
deny copyright protection to businesses claiming protection for incidental 
features of their products, as this practice creates a system that inequitably favors 
                                                          
64 See discussion supra Part II. 
65 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995). 
66 See discussion supra Part II. 
67 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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intellectual property owners over the public. Intellectual property owners are 
overprotected by a dual copyright and trademark protection in the same product.  
As a result, they are overcompensated with a double reward with respect to them, 
whereas the public needs to pay a double price to intellectual property owners for 
acquiring and using these products.  Should the courts not address this conflict, 
corporations will continue to invoke copyright protection for labels, logos, and 
other insignias, even though these product features are far from constituting 
works promoting “the progress of … arts by securing for limited times to authors 
… the exclusive right to their respective writings”, to which the Constitution 
refers to lay out the justification of copyright protection.
68
  Ultimately, copyright 
law will become (or simply continue to be) a tool for corporations to promote 
their business models and marketing strategies—areas that have traditionally 
been regulated under the rule of trademark law and unfair competition law.
69
  
Most relevant, corporations will continue to segment international markets with 
impunity to the detriment of consumers. 
 
This situation is not what Congress envisioned when it enacted the Copyright Act 
and other intellectual property legislation.  Attempts to exploit overlapping 
protections are quite common in the business world, but eventually these 
business stratagems will not survive the scrutiny of the courts.  Already, in 1880 
in Baker v. Selden,
70
 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that copyright 
protection could apply to functional systems which could be protected, instead, 
by patents.  More recently, in 1989 in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, 
Inc.
71
 and again in 2001 in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,
72
 the 
Court repeated the position that unpatented useful items (or useful items for 
which a patent has expired) cannot and should not be further protected under the 
rule of trademark or copyright law. In 2003, in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., the Supreme Court also began to tackle the issue of 
overlapping copyright and trademark protection and urged courts to police the 
                                                          
68 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
69 See generally Christopher A. Mohr, Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law: An End Run 
Around KMart v. Cartier, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 561 (1996) (describing the possibility to circumvent 
the holding in KMart with copyright law).  
70 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880). 
71 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989). 
72 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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boundaries between copyright and trademark law in order to prevent the misuse 
and overextension of intellectual property rights.
73
  Although this case did not 
address the issue of copyright misuse, the Court clearly opposed the opportunistic 
gaming of copyright and trademark protection to satisfy private corporate 
interests against the public policy objectives pursued by different intellectual 
property rights.
74
  Following this line of reasoning, courts (and possibly 
Congress) should resolve the problems that overlapping copyright and trademark 
protection may cause in the context of international trade and gray market goods.  
Courts should explicitly prohibit as copyright misuse the practice of leveraging 
copyright protection for incidental product features to block gray market goods.  
The Supreme Court (and possibly Congress) should also clarify, once and for all, 
the interpretation of sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a) of the Copyright Act and the 
territorial extent—national or international—of the rule of copyright first sale. 
 
 
VI. Waiting for Answers: Could the Decisions in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons and Omega v. Costco (II) Call the Corporate Game Over? 
 
As I have indicated in Part III, judicial guidance on the relationship between the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and international trade could soon be 
provided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,75 
and the Ninth’s Circuit decision in Omega v. Costco Wholesale.76 In Kirtsaeng, 
the Court is set to address the interpretation of section 109(a) of the Copyright 
Act and the issue of the geographical extent of the rule of copyright first sale. In 
Omega, the Ninth Circuit has the opportunity to assess whether Omega’s 
leveraging of copyright protection for a small insignia affixed to the back of its 
watches to block the importation of unauthorized watches into the United States 
constitutes copyright misuse. The outcomes of these cases could finally resolve 
the uncertainty and confusion that currently characterize this area.  As I advocate 
below, such judicial guidance could also be coupled with appropriate legislative 
action by Congress.  Notably, Congress could introduce into the Copyright Act a 
                                                          
73 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
74 Id. at 34. 
75 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1905 (U.S. 2012). 
76 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11-57137 (9th Cir. July 25, 2012).   
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specific provision rendering copyright protection for incidental product features 
unenforceable in the context of international trade and gray market products. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kirtsaeng following the Second 
Circuit’s decision in favor of John Wiley & Sons.77 Dr. Kirtsaeng petitioned the 
Court and again asked to clarify the application of section 109(a) of the 
Copyright Act to foreign manufactured products—the issue that the Court had 
left unresolved with its non-decision in Costco v. Omega in 2010. The Second 
Circuit’s decision in Kirtsaeng was considerably problematic because it relied on 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Quality King and interpreted the language 
“lawfully made under this title” in section 109(a) as “lawfully made in the United 
States.”78  In particular, the Second Circuit departed from the position by the 
Ninth Circuitthat section 109(a)  applies to foreign manufactured products after 
their first lawful sale in the United States.
79
  Instead, the Second Circuit stated 
that “[w]hile perhaps a close call . . . in light of its necessary interplay with 
section 602(a)(1), section 109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to works 
manufactured domestically.”80 Under this ruling, only domestically manufactured 
products would then be subject to the first sale rule,  while section 109(a) would 
not apply to foreign-made products, even after their authorized sale in the United 
States.
81
  This position was (and still is) clearly problematic as it implied that the 
owners of copyrighted goods manufactured abroad  could prevent retailers, 
consumers, and even libraries and museums, to resell, lend, or gift these goods 
even after the goods have been lawfully sold in the United States.   
 
                                                          
77 John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011). 
78 The Second Circuit directly relied on Justice Ginsburg’s  concurrence in Quality King v. L’anza 
Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998). (Ginsburg J., concurring) (holding that the first sale 
doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside of the United States.). 
79 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008); Parfums Givenchy, 
Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994); BMG Music v Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
80 John Wiley & Sons, 654 F.3d at 221 (noting that the Ninth Circuit held that section 109 applies 
also to foreign manufactured works sold in the US). 
81 Id.  
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In October 2012, the Court heard the oral arguments in the case.
82
 The Justices 
struggled in reconciling the outcome of the decision in Quality King with the 
intention of the legislature in enacting section 109(a) of the Copyright Act.  
Notably, the Justices underlined that Congress could not have intended a 
(“horrible”) system wherein foreign manufactured goods would not be subject to 
the principle of copyright first sale.
83
  Still, the Justices also showed reasonable 
concerns for the impact that a broader interpretation of section 109(a)—a shift 
toward a system of international first sale in copyright law—could have on 
domestic businesses and their ability to price products differently across different 
jurisdictions.
84
  Ultimately, the outcome of the Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng 
could follow one of three solutions. First, the Court could reverse and agree with 
petitioner’s argument that the language “lawfully made under this title” should 
not be interpreted as “lawfully made in the United States” but instead as 
“lawfully made anywhere in the world.”  This outcome would end the corporate 
game of exploiting and leveraging copyright protection for incidental features of 
uncopyrightable products to block gray market products. Corporations’ ability to 
engage in this practice would end when both copyright and trademark law follow 
the same rule of international first sale.  Second, the Court could agree, instead, 
with the position so far supported by the Ninth Circuit that section 109(a) and the 
first sale rule apply to copyrighted products (regardless of their place of 
manufacture) only after their lawful sale in the United States.
85
  Third, the Court 
could even affirm the Second Circuit and rule that section 109(a) indeed applies 
only to domestically manufactured products.
86
  In either of these two latter 
hypotheses, corporations’ ability to leverage copyright protection for incidental 
features of their products to circumvent the rule of international trademark first 
sale would continue—with respect to all unauthorized imports if the Court adopts 
an approach similar to the Ninth Circuit’s or with respect to the unauthorized 
                                                          
82 Transcript of Oral Argument, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012) (No. 
11-697), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-697.pdf. 
83 Id. at 29-32. 
84 Id. at 32. 
85 See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008); L’anza Research 
Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1996). 
86 John Wiley & Sons, 654 F.3d at 210; see also Pearson Educ., Inc. v Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 
416 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding dubitante in a case also dealing with imported textbooks, that the 
first sale rule does not apply to foreign manufactured goods). 
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importation of goods manufactured abroad if the Court affirms the Second 
Circuit. 
 
Because of the uncertain outcome in Kirtsaeng, it is fundamental that the Ninth 
Circuit affirms the decision of the California District Court in the case Omega v. 
Costco,
87
 on remand after the Supreme Court case in 2010, Costco v. Omega, and 
rules that Omega misused its copyright protection in the Omega Globe Design.  
Even though the Ninth Circuit previously found in favor of Omega,
88
 the Ninth 
Circuit has already embraced a broader interpretation of copyright misuse in 
other decisions.
89
 Thus, the Ninth Circuit could, and should affirm the District 
Court in this case.    Omega itself conceded that “a purpose of the copyrighted 
Omega Globe Design was to control the importation and sale of its watches 
containing the design, as the watches could not be copyrighted.”90 In turn,  the 
District Court found that “Omega misused its copyright of the Omega Globe 
Design by leveraging its limited monopoly in being able to control the 
importation of that design to control the importation of its . . . watches.”91  
Traditionally, courts limited the defense of copyright misuse primarily to 
“situations involving antitrust tying agreements and restrictive licensing 
agreements,”92 yet the District Court supported the position that these precedents 
would not exclude “that copyright misuse could exist in other situations,” like in 
the situation at issue.
93
  Omega, the District Court said, “used the defensive 
shield of copyright law as an offensive sword,”94 and as such misused its 
copyright in the Omega Globe Design.   Ultimately, the public policy underlying 
copyright law and the subsequent application of the copyright misuse doctrine 
clearly weigh in favor of a ruling in Costco’s favor in this case.  Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit should affirm the District Court’s finding that Omega was 
                                                          
87 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11-57137 (9th Cir. July 25, 2012).  
88 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (in this decision the court 
addressed only the territorial extent of Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act and did not address the 
issue of copyright misuse). This decision was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Costco 
Wholesale Corp. v Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
89 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1997). 
90 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 04-05443, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011). 
91 Id at 3. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 2. 
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leveraging and misusing its copyrights in the Omega Globe Design—a minuscule 
(irrelevant) insignia affixed to the back on its watches—exclusively to prevent 
the legitimate importation of otherwise functional and uncopyrightable watches. 
 
In addition to the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit (or other Courts of 
Appeals), Congress could also step into the debate and enact ad hoc legislation in 
this area.  In particular, similarly to countries like Australia
95
 and Singapore,
96
 
Congress could enact as part of the Copyright Act a provision stating that “the 
importation or sale of an article does not infringe the copyright embodied in 
elements that are merely ‘accessory’ to the article.”  As under Australia’s and 
Singapore’s Copyright Acts, Congress could include in the definition of 
“accessory,” items such as: labels incorporated into the surface of an article; 
packaging or containers in which an article is packaged or contained; labels 
                                                          
95 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1), 10(d), 44C, and 112 (Austl.).  The original text of the 
Australian Copyright Act was amended in 1998, 2000, and 2001.  In particular, with respect to the 
subject matter of this Essay , see Schedule 3, Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth) (Austl.). “[I]f 
the label or instructional material has already been approved by the manufacturer as an accessory to 
the product (say, for use in another country), then the importation into Australia of the product 
itself should not be stopped. The issue is that the force of copyright law was never meant to apply 
to the contents of the bottle of liqueur which is really the subject of the importation.”  Bill Digest 
160 1996-97, Copyright Amendment Bill 1997, Main Provisions, Schedule 3, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/BD9697/97bd160#Passage. 
For an overview of the motivations that brought to the adoption of this legislative amendment, see 
also R. & A. Bailey & Co. Ltd v. Boccaccio Pty Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR 701 (Austl.) (decided before 
the 1998 Copyright Amendment Act). For a judicial application of the new provision, see 
Polo/Lauren Company L.P. v. Ziliani Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 195 (decided after the 1998 
Copyright Amendment Act) (Austl.). I would like to particularly thank Professor Mary LaFrance 
for indicating to me the relevance of the Australian legal system and the two above mentioned 
Australian cases with respect to the national debate on the same issue in the United States. 
Professor LaFrance has developed, for the first time among United States scholars, a specific 
proposal advocating an amendment to the Copyright Act to include a similar statutory limitation 
also in the United States. See Mary LaFrance, Avoiding Mutant Trademarks: A Statutory Exclusion 
for Copyrighted Accessories to Parallel Imports, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY 
CHALLENGES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (forthcoming 2013-14) (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds.) 
(on file with author); Mary LaFrance, Wag the Dog: Using Incidental Intellectual Property Rights 
to Block Parallel Imports, (article draft) (on file with author). 
96 Singapore Copyright Act of 1987, §§ 7(1), 40A(1) (2006) (Sing.) (as amended by Copyright 
Amendment Act No. 14 of 1994). It should be noted that Singapore follows a rule of international 
first sale both in copyright and trademark law, thus Singapore courts have not addressed to date any 
attempt by corporations to leverage copyright protection to circumvent the rule of trademark law. 
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affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or accompanying, the 
packaging or container in which the article is packaged or contained; written 
instructions, warranties or other information provided with the article.
97
  This 
legislative amendment would not conflict with any of the possible interpretations 
of sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a) that the Supreme Court could adopt in 
Kirtsaeng, such as if section 109(a) should be read as establishing a rule of 
international or rather national first sale.  The amendment, instead, would assist 
the judiciary both in the short and long term by creating a specific prohibition 
against the leveraging of copyright protection for “accessory” features regardless 
of the territorial extent—national or international—of the rule on copyright first 
sale in the United States.  Most crucial, such amendment would render 
unenforceable copyright protection for incidental elements of functional products 
even in those cases where the courts might still be hesitant in defining this 
practice as copyright misuse.  As expected, the corporate world is already 
lobbying to overrule a possible outcome of Kirtsaeng in favor of international 
copyright first sale, and is calling for new legislation that would clearly 
(re)instate a system of national first sale.
98
  In light of these efforts, an ad hoc 
                                                          
97 Section 10(1) of the Australia Copyright Act defines as “accessory” the followings: “(a) a label 
affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or accompanying, the article; (b) the 
packaging or container in which the article is packaged or contained; (c) a label affixed to, 
displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or accompanying, the packaging or container in 
which the article is packaged or contained; (d) a written instruction, warranty or other information 
provided with the article; (e) a record embodying an instructional sound recording, or a copy of an 
instructional cinematograph film, provided with the article.” Id. Section 7(1) of the Singapore 
Copyright Act provides a similar list of items to be considered “accessory.” Id.  
98 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft Agreement, U.S.-
Austl., Feb. 2011, available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-
chapter.pdf [hereinafter TPP, February 2011 IP Chapter Draft]; see also Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, Draft (Selected Provisions), U.S.-Austl., Sept. 2011, available 
at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf. [hereinafter 
TPP-2]. The TPP is currently being negotiated between Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. In particular, Article 4.2 
of the TPP IP Chapter Draft states that “[e]ach Party shall provide to authors, performers, and 
producers of phonograms the right to authorize or prohibit the importation into that Party’s territory 
of copies of the work, performance, or phonogram made without authorization, or made outside 
that Party’s territory with the authorization of the author, performer, or producer of the 
phonogram.” TPP, February 2011 IP Chapter Draft, art. 4.2. Interestingly, in line with a possible 
legislative amendment prohibiting leveraging copyright protection for “accessory” product features 
in the context of international trade, footnote 11 to the proposed text of Article 4.2, specifies that 
“[w]ith respect to copies of works and phonograms that have been placed on the market by the 
relevant right holder, the obligations described in Article [4.2] apply only to books, journals, sheet 
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amendment prohibiting copyright protection for incidental product features in the 
context of international trade seems to be necessary in order to prevent the 
opportunist exploitation of overlapping copyright and trademark protection on 
otherwise uncopyrightable products. 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The opportunistic exploitation of one type of intellectual property right to expand 
other types of rights is not an uncommon phenomenon in the business world.  
Once a specific overlapping practice is brought to the attention of the courts, they 
have generally redressed the imbalances that result from this exploitation by 
prohibiting or limiting overlapping rights.  Accordingly, United States courts 
should prohibit the current practice of claiming copyright protection for 
incidental (often insignificant) product features of otherwise functional and 
uncopyrightable products and leveraging this protection in order to control the 
distribution of these products in the international market.  To this end, courts 
should boldly and consistently embrace the position that this practice amounts to 
copyright misuse insofar as it permits copyright owners to use “copyright in a 
manner that violates the public policy embodied in the grant of the copyright.’”99  
Notably, the Ninth Circuit should affirm the District Court in the appeal currently 
pending in Omega v. Costco, and should confirm that Omega’s copyrighted 
insignia, as well as Omega’s attempt to segment the market by leveraging 
copyright on that insignia constitute copyright misuses.   
 
A decision by the Ninth Circuit confirming that Omega misused copyright law 
would prove crucial, especially if the Supreme Court confirms a system of 
                                                                                                                                                
music, sound recordings, computer programs, and audio and visual works (i.e., categories of 
products in which the value of the copyrighted material represents substantially all of the value of 
the product).” TPP, February 2011 IP Chapter Draft, art. 4.2, n. 11. However, the last part of 
footnote 11 concludes with the language, “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, each Party may provide 
the protection described in Article [4.2] to a broader range of goods.” Id. This language could be 
interpreted as permitting copyright protection for a range of goods where the copyrighted materials 
do not represent “substantially all the value of the product[s]” Id. This in turn could be interpreted 
as permitting copyright protection for incidental product features for those members of the TPP that 
would favor this approach, thus overruling a possible decision in favor of Costco and copyright 
misuse in Omega SA v. Costco Wholesale Corp. by the Ninth Circuit. 
99 Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 521. 
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national copyright first sale in Kirtsaeng. A decision in Kirtsaeng in favor of 
national copyright first sale would in fact perpetuate the difference in the first 
sale rules between copyright and trademark law in the United States. This 
distinction would leave intact the incentive for corporations to obtain and 
leverage copyright protection in the context of international trade of consumer 
products.  Still, the Ninth Circuit should find in favor of Costco and find that 
Omega misused copyright law regardless of the outcome of the decision in 
Kirtsaeng including the case where the Supreme Court would reverse the 
decision on appeal and rule in favor of a rule of international copyright first sale.  
In particular, courts in the United States should take the fundamental step of 
defining as copyright misuse the practice of leveraging copyright protection for 
incidental product features to segment international markets.  The Ninth Circuit 
currently has the opportunity to mark this step.  Ideally, Congress could follow 
the example of other jurisdictions by enacting ad hoc legislation that would 
explicitly prohibit, or render unenforceable, copyright protection for incidental 
features of otherwise uncopyrightable products, once and for all.  Such legislative 
amendment seems increasingly necessary considering the corporate world is 
already lobbying to overrule a possible outcome of Kirtsaeng in favor of 
international copyright first sale. 
 
Until the day Congress acts, the responsibility nevertheless remains with the 
judiciary to safeguard the public policy objectives that are at the core of 
intellectual property rights, in this case, the respective and distinct domain of 
copyright and trademark law.  These objectives have never included the creation 
of a system where corporations could invoke copyright protection for the labels, 
warranties, instructions, packaging design, or insignias affixed onto hidden parts 
of their products rather than for actual works of authorship.  In such system, 
corporations derive most, or all of the benefits of copyright protection, and 
multiple rewards for the sale of the same products. Meanwhile, the public covers 
all the costs of this protection and is deprived of the benefit resulting from the 
sales of genuine gray market products. Courts in the United States, beginning 
with the Ninth Circuit in Omega v. Costco, should now redress this growing 
imbalance.  Courts should finally call the corporate game of misusing copyright 
law to protect incidental, often insignificant, product features over. 
